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Abstract 
 
As a regional-level organization that was founded in 1967 with 10 South East Asia state 
members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos, 
Myanmar, Cambodia), ASEAN is frequently seen as a unique case of regional integration 
manifested politically and economically. When society interconnection and integration 
are more globally intense and bring more serious attentions for social theorists through 
“Globalization” concept, it cannot be denied that regionalism phenomenon is part of 
critical observation due to many unanswered questions: How does the regionalism 
process form? To what extend “globalization” forms regionalism? How do state member 
actors face globalization process which is sometimes uncontrolled and unregulated with 
huge consequence such as 1997 Asia Financial Crisis? How is arrangement system of a 
regional community set up considering no one cannot ensure the final process of 
globalization in the future, etc.  
ASEAN – proven not only an economic block – possesses its own formula in effort to 
achieve its economic, politic and sociocultural goals and in theoretical understanding 
and praxis of globalization phenomenon are hoped to give significant contribution for 
ASEAN regional integration process while still being faithful to the main goal: to push 
development in various aspects through regional collaboration with every state member 
for social welfare. 
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Introduction 
 
 The mushrooming of various regional organizations in the past decades and the  
emerging study of what we called pervasive “globalization” has been creating a specific 
focus on two interesting phenomenon: “globalization” and “regionalism”. In the political 
field we can find regional organizations such as The Organization of African Union 
(OAU) or the Organization of American States (OAS), together with the micro-regional 
bodies such as the Vise grad Pact and the Pentagonale in Central Europe, the Arab 
Maghreb Union (AMU) and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) in the Middle East; the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Southern African 
Development Community (SADC) in Africa and regional security groupings like the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, now OSCE) and the ASEAN 
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Regional Forum (ARF).
1
 In the economic field, the regional schemes like Mercado 
Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR) or the Southern Cone Common Market, the Andean Pact, 
the Central American Common Market (CACM), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Association of Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN) – to 
mention a few – have stood together as „bloc regionalism‟ in the Europe, America and 
Asia Pacific. 
2
 
 How can we understand this phenomenon? Is it regionalism inseparable aspect of 
globalization, either as an impact or as a response to globalization – thus it come later or 
regionalism has its own driving force? How can we clarify both processes since in certain 
cases states-led sub-regionalism or regionalism has been urged by political and economic 
goals? 
 This paper will study ASEAN in its process of developing regionalism in Asia or 
Asia Pacific in the context of globalization – that is as a process of functional integration 
of economic activities across national boundaries.
3
 As a regional organization among 
Southeast Asia countries, ASEAN is an interesting case study since its establishment she 
has combined political and economic approaches in responding to the changing of her 
environment. The Cold War context has been creating an ASEAN‟s principles, which is 
peaceful and neutral to the two big super powers (the United States and USSR) whilst in 
the post Cold War, she was prioritizing economic cooperation and integration among 
ASEAN‟s and non-ASEAN‟s states. 
 
Globalization as an Economic Integration Process 
 David Held and Peter Dicken have helped us in understanding “globalization” as 
a process. 
4
 Usually we locate the beginning of contemporary globalization just after the 
end of the Second World War, without realized that the historical process of globalization 
had started long time before. By locating globalization in expansive spatial connections, 
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for example, Held argued that globalization can be thought as “[a] process (or set of 
process) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations 
and transactions – assessed in terms of their extensity, intensity, velocity and impact – 
generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction 
and the exercise of power”.5 The importance in his formulation is that globalization is not 
understood as a spatial delimited processes – like „localization‟, „nationalization‟, 
„regionalization‟ or „internationalization‟ or is not conceived in opposition to more 
spatially delimited processes but it standing in a complex and dynamic relationship with 
them.
6
  
 Further, Dicken has emphasized that “[a]lthough in quantitative terms the world 
economy was perhaps at least as integrated economically before 1913 as it is today – in 
some respects the nature of that integration was qualitatively very different”. 
“[G]lobalization processes are qualitatively different from internationalization processes. 
They involve not merely the geographical extension of economic activity across national 
boundaries but also – and more importantly – the functional integration of such 
internationally dispersed activities”.7 In sum, for Dicken globalization is also a complex 
of inter-related processes, both internationalization and globalization process coexist 
where undoubtedly there are globalizing forces at work but without a fully globalized 
world economy created yet.  
 By understanding globalization as the functional integration of internationally 
dispersed economic activities on a continuum with the regional and by considering that 
the growing extensity and intensity of global interconnectedness may speed up of global 
interactions; the growing phenomenon of “regionalism” will be tried to be seen more 
clearly. 
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 Andrew Hurrell elaborated some factors in which globalization may act as a 
stimulus to regionalism.
8
 Most importantly, according to him “[g]lobal integration may 
have acted as a powerful stimulus to economic regionalism by altering and intensifying 
patterns of mercantilist economic competitions. Change in technology, in 
communications, in the operation of global markets, in the growth of global system of 
production, has certainly had a profound impact on the way in which government has 
defined the two most important goals of foreign policy – economic development and 
political autonomy – and the range of acceptable trade-offs between them”.9 More 
specifically, Hurrell explained the position of states vis a vis that “economic symptom‟ 
that “…[O]n the hand, globalization means that states are facing powerful pressures 
toward the homogenization of economic policies, to attract foreign investment and 
technology and to compete in an ever  more closely linked market place. These 
systematically driven pressures towards market liberal policies have increased the 
importance of export expansion and trade liberalization at both global and regional level. 
On the other hand, the nature of competition presses toward the formation of larger units, 
both for economic efficiency and to ensure the political power necessary to bargain 
effectively over the rules and institutions that govern the world economy”.10 Very clearly 
Hurell mentioned the importance to understand regional economic integration in terms of 
interest between state elites and firms in response to the structural changes in the world 
economy. 
 But is it adequate just to see economic regionalism through the neo-mercantilist 
competition perspective? How can we understand the evolution of some regional 
organizations, which emphasis the political projects in certain time and economic projects 
in other different time or which emphasis both political economy projects in the same 
time?  
 Helge Hveem reminded us another factor like “geopolitics” behind even the 
economically motivated regional projects, especially during the early post-War II period. 
That is why he differentiated the regional projects into a different “generation” phase, 
where the factors and forces behind the regional phenomenon become more varied and 
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the causal relationship is more complex.
11
 The first generation of regional integration, for 
instance, since the end of World War II was to achieve the goals of security and political 
stability while to take the geopolitical and ideological context of the Cold War as a 
primary ordering principle. The second generation of regional integration was in the 
1960s and 1970s which was also based on the Cold War context. With the end of Cold 
War and the advance of globalization process the context have also changed from 
“geopolitics” to geo-economic”, from security approach to the economic competitiveness 
approach in its international relations.
12
 The implication is also clear, that regionalism as 
part of states response to their international environment has also changed the 
characteristics of regionalism in most part of the world. 
 The emergence of explicitly regional economic blocs with trade as the 
fundamental basis of their existence has often been seen as the phenomenon of 
international economic integration. Dicken noted some major regional economic blocs 
which emerge today. 
Table 1: Major Regional Economic Blocs 
Name Membership Date Type 
ANCOM 
(Andean Common Market) 
Bolivia, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela 
1969 (revived 1990) CU 
AFTA  
(ASEAN Free Trade Agreement) 
10 Southeast Asian 
Countries 
1967 (ASEAN) 
1992 (AFTA) 
FTA 
CARICOM (Caribbean 
Community) 
Caribbean‟s countries 1973 CM 
EFTA (European Free Trade 
Association) 
Iceland, Norway, 
Lichtenstein, Switzerland 
1960 FTA 
EU (European Union) 
Austria, Belgium, Denmark 
France, Finland, Germany 
Greece, Ireland, Italy,  
Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, UK 
1957 (E-CM) 
1992 (EU) 
Economic 
Union 
MERCUSOR (Southern 
Cone Common Market) 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Paraguay, Uruguay 
 
1991 CM 
NAFTA (North American 
Free Trade Agreement) 
Canada, Mexico, US  1994 FTA 
Source: Dicken, p. 104 (CU-Customs Union, CM-Common Market, FTA-Free Trade Area). 
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 The degree of integration differentiates the character of each regional economic 
blocs, for example those who apply free trade area  means that trade restriction between 
member states are removed by agreement but member states retain their individual trade 
policies toward non-member states. While the common market implements not only the 
removal of trade barriers between member states and adoption of a common external 
trade policy but it also permits the free movement of factors of production between 
member states. 
13
 
 In its development, the regional dynamic of trading blocs that involved various 
and complicated arrangements and sometimes created stronger tension on certain trade 
relations issues – and to some extent involved various actors of state and non state – has 
just asserted that the process of economic integration as part of globalization process has 
not being finalized yet. Regionalism can be more accelerated following the integration of 
economic activity in all its aspects: transnational flow of capital and labor, the 
domination of multinational companies, the implementation of new electronic technology 
like satellites, internet, digital or globalization of finance. 
 
Southeast Asia in the Globalization Context 
 Before we observe the regionalism initiative in Southeast Asia through ASEAN, it 
is worthwhile to see how Asia or Southeast Asia specifically grows economically in the 
context of globalization. Through some evidences, among other in terms of Foreign 
Direct Investment (FDI) flow, trade and production, we can see the processes of 
economic integration regionally and globally which is still going on. 
 
Concentration of Direct Investment in Asia 
 FDI which create Transnational Corporations (TNCs) in Asia has been one of 
central feature of globalization process because of its growth. FDI restrictions that have 
been dramatically reduced as a result of a host of factors have led to a rapid expansion of 
FDI flows around the world during the last 20 years. From only $ 53.7 billion in 1980, 
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FDI outflows reached $1.4 trillion in 2000. 
14
 And in the beginning 1990s, economies in 
Asia and Pacific started to receive increasingly larger share of world FDI inflows. 
Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand among the 20 largest FDI recipients during 1991-1993 
while the total value of FDI inflows to the top 10 Asian destinations substantially 
increased during the last decade, from $ 31,877 million during the period of 1991-93 
became $ 106,309 million in the period of 1998-2000. 
15
 
 
Table 2  Top 10 FDI Destinations in Developing Asia (annual average, $ million) 
Rank Host Economy 1991-93 
1 China, People‟s Rep 14,346 
2 Malaysia 4,729 
3 Singapore 3,926 
4 Hong Kong, China 2,082 
5 Thailand 1,978 
6 Indonesia 1,754 
7 Taipei, China 1,022 
8 Korea, Rep of 832 
9 Philippines 670 
10 Vietnam 539 
 Total 31,877 
 (Percent of World Total) 17.3 
   
Rank Host Economy 1998-2000 
1 China, People‟s Rep 41,614 
2 Hong Kong, China 33,768 
3 Korea, Rep of 8,009 
4 Singapore 7,866 
5 Thailand 3,839 
6 Malaysia 3,466 
7 Taipei, China 2,692 
8 India 2,373 
9 Vietnam  1,491 
10 Philippines 1,190 
 Total 106,309 
 (Percent of World Total) 9.7 
Source: UNCTAD (2002) 
 
                                                 
14
 See Douglas H. Brooks, Emma Xiaoqin Fan, Lea R. Sumulong, “Foreign Direct Investment in 
Developing Asia: Trends, Effects and Likely Issues for the Forthcoming WTO Negotiations”, ERD 
Working Paper No 38, p 1, (Manila: ADB, 2003). As stated, many factors cause rapid expansion of FDI 
flows like accelerating technological change, emergence of globally integrated production and marketing 
networks, existence of bilateral investment treaties, prescriptions from multilateral development banks and 
positive evidence from developing countries that have opened their doors to FDI. 
15
 Ibid p. 3 
 8 
The table also shows that China, Hong Kong, Korea, and Singapore as new 
Industrializing Economies positioned in the four top ranking during 1998-2000 indicates 
that the geographical distribution of FDI in Asia become more complex with strong 
orientation toward East Asian countries. 
By using different previous data comparison on the FDI Inflow 1981-1994 to all 
ASEAN Countries, there was increasing in the average per year from $ 3,0 billion during 
the period of 1981-86 became $ 9,5 billion in the period of 1987-92, whilst fluctuated to 
$ 16,5 billion in 1993 and the more increased to 19,6 in 1994. (See Table 3). 
16
 
 
Table 3 FDI Inflow, 1981-1994, (in billion US$) 
 1981-86 (av.) 1987-92 1993 (av.) 1994 
World  57,7 171,9 208,4 225,7 
APEC 32,1 80,3 99,2 125,6 
 (55,6) (46,7) (47,6) (55,6) 
     
Developing Countries  5,6 18,0 47,1 67,6 
 (8,7) (105) (22,6) (25,5) 
     
ASEAN (a) 3,0 9,5 16,5 19,6 
 (5,2) (5,5) (7,9) (8,7) 
     
Indonesia 0,2 1,0 2,0 3,0 
Malaysia 1,0 2,3 5,2 4,5 
Philippines 0,1 0,5 0,8 1,5 
Singapore 1,4 1,6 1,7 2,7 
Thailand 0,3 1,6 1,7 2,7 
Other East Asia 2,0 8,5 30,6 38,0 
 3,5 5,0 14,7 16,8 
China 1,0 4,7 27,5 33,8 
Hong Kong 0,6 1,9 1,7 2,0 
South Korea 0,2 0,8 0,5 0,8 
Taiwan, ROC 0,2 1,1 0,9 1,4 
Source: UNCTAD, Division of Transnational Corporations and Investment FDI Database. 
Notes: (a) excluding Brunei and Vietnam where FDI inflows were less than US$ 0.1 billion. 
Figure in bracket showed percentage toward world‟s FDI inflows. Cited from Hadi Soesastro, 
“Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment – New Challenges Facing Asian Development 
Countries,” in The Indonesian Quarterly XXIV, no 2, 1996.  
 
 
 
                                                 
16
 C.P.F. Luhulima, ASEAN Menuju Postur Baru. (Jakarta: CSIS, 1997), p 174. 
 9 
Concentration of Trade in Asia 
 The rapid growth and concentration of economic relations especially through 
manufacturing production or merchandise trade often be seen through the revival of 
regionalism in Western Europe (European Union – UE), North America (North American 
Free Trade Agreement – NAFTA) and East and Southeast Asia or known as “Global 
Triad”. 17 Global Triad describes the emergence of three giant trading blocs where their 
concentrations in terms of value remove the multilateral trading system. 
 Figure  1 shows that in 1994, these macro-regions contained 87% of total world 
manufacturing world output (30%, 29% and 28% for East and Southeast Asia, UE and 
NAFTA) and generated 80% of world merchandise exports (39%, 23% and 18% for EU, 
East and Southeast Asia and NAFTA).
18
 Moreover Dicken explained that over the past 
ten to fifteen years, the degree of economic concentration in these three regions have 
proved increase.  
 
Figure 1. The Global Triad – concentration of manufacturing production and  
    Merchandise Trade 
 
 
 
Note: All figures are in millions of dollars 
Source: Based on data in UNIDO (1996, Statistical Annex); WTO (1995, International 
Trade, Table A2). 
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 Meanwhile, through the previous study about the changing pattern of East Asia 
trade, Young noted that since 1970, East Asia‟s (which refer to Japan, the NIEs of Hong 
Kong, South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan and the four ASEAN namely Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand) trade growth has been 16% per year in current 
dollar terms, outperforming every other region of the world. The NIEs and China, in 
particular, have maintained rates of growth in their trade for almost 20% per year.
19
 This 
rapid of growth of trade has enabled East Asia to increase its share of the world trade 
rapidly (see Table 4).
20
 In 1970, East Asia accounted for 11% of world trade, while North 
America accounted for nearly twice as much and the EC nearly four times of the amount. 
By 1990, the shares of both North America and the EC had declined slightly while the 
East Asia region has contributed to the increasing share of world trade. The NIEs and 
China nearly tripled its share between 1970 and 1990, from 2.5 to 7.0 percent and from 
0.6 to 2.0 percent. ASEAN 4 and Japan also have substantial gains in their share of world 
trade. 
21
 
Table 4  Regional Share of World Trade (%), 1970 and 1990 
Region 1970 1990 
East Asia 10.8 194 
Japan 5.9 7.7 
NIEs 2.5 7.0 
ASEAN4 1.8 2.7 
China  0.6 2.0 
Australasia  2.1 1.5 
North America 20.7 18.1 
United States 14.7 13.3 
Canada 5.3 3.6 
Mexico 0.8 1.2 
South America 5.8 4.2 
Western Europe 48.2 46.8 
EC-12 40.8 40.0 
EFTA 7.6 6.8 
Rest of World 12.6 1.0 
Source: IMF, Direction of Trade, Washington DC, Various issues: International Economic Data 
Bank, Australian National University, World Trade Cape, Canberra, 1992. 
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ASEAN and Regional Development 
  
ASEAN, which consists of 10 member countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Singapore, the Philippines, Thailand, Brunei, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar was 
established in 1967 and basically was a response to its environment‟s internal and 
external threats. Environment‟s context at that time was Cold War started from 1947 up 
to around 1989 after the World War II was over 
22
 where only the two nations – the 
United States and the Soviet Union – had the powerful military strength, ideological 
conviction and political will to fill the power vacuums. So that “super power rivalry” 
became the main characteristic of the global politics.
23
 While in the regional level, its 
colored by various territorial disputes among the member states or what we called it 
“conventional conflict”: the Sabah dispute between the Philippines and Malaysia (1962), 
the Batu Putih Island dispute between Malaysia and Singapore (1976), the border tension 
between Malaysia and Thailand based on 1922 agreement and the Sipadan and Ligitan 
dispute between Indonesia and Malaysia based on the British-Dutch convention of 1891. 
While the Spratly dispute among Malaysia, the Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam, China and 
Taiwan was part of the multilateral conflict in the region.
24
 During the period of 1970s 
and 1980s almost we found that almost all ASEAN states struggled for their economic 
development and internal political stability.
25
 
ASEAN response to its contextual environment was reflected very clearly in the 
Declaration‟s main goal that was to restore and re-harmonize intra-regional relations and 
to arrange into the structure of a Southeast Asia‟s New Order based on principles of 
mutual respect and peaceful coexistence, whatever condition of the social and political 
system of its members. Through this new structure, ASEAN want to enhance economic 
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and social-cultural cooperation: “to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and 
cultural development in the region through joint endeavors in the spirit of equality and 
partnership in order to strengthen the foundation for prosperous and peaceful community 
of South-East Asia nations”. (Bangkok Declaration, 1967). Although as stated that 
economic goals is more prominent rather than “strengthening peace and regional 
stability”, but ASEAN founders convince that there is strong relation between economic 
(growth), people development and cooperation in one side and peace and stability in the 
other side. This basic premise of ASEAN has been formulated as an integrated attitude in 
economics as well as political security cooperation and this specifically reflected in most 
of ASEAN‟s documents like the Bangkok Declaration, the Declaration of Zone and 
Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), and the Declaration of ASEAN Concord and 
Treaty of Amity and Cooperation of Southeast Asia (TAC). 
If regionalism is strongly based on political-economy understanding as a 
sovereign states, what kind of initiative ASEAN doing for its economic regional 
integration? In developing economic cooperation, which is expected to have a regional 
impact, ASEAN at least has initiated three kind of initiatives in terms of ASEAN Growth 
Triangle Project, AFTA (ASEAN Free Trade Area) and ASEAN Investment Area 
Project. 
 
ASEAN Growth Triangle: SIJORI (Singapore-Johor-Riau) 
 Growth triangle of sub-regional economic area covers an area which 
geographically border on or adjacent, crossing border of two, three or four national states 
which is conducting process of cooperation or doing integration of its economic activity. 
These activities go beyond the political border, political and economic system and 
involving an intensive flow of goods, services and people who come across those states‟ 
border.
26
 The basic idea of the growth triangle area is the existence of diversification 
factors among those sub-areas, which enable cooperation that creating competitive 
advantage in the export promotion.  
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 Conceptually, this economic growth sub-area can be divided into three forms that 
in reality can overlap each other; they are (a) the spill-over of metropolitan area to its 
surrounding areas, (b) the neighborhood area with similar interest and (c) developing 
resources and infrastructure together.
27
 The first form is basically the spill over of central 
metropolitan, which characterized by better infrastructure, capital and manpower to other 
marginal areas traverse the border. In other word there will be a complementary in the 
form of land, resources, manpower in one side and transportation infrastructure, 
communication and financial facility in the other side. The second one is formed by 
geographical closeness, historic, ethnic or cultural relations among areas along the border 
which is facilitated by cheaper costs on transportation, information and transactional cost. 
While the third form is more on cooperation projects on investment in multi states and 
agglomeration scale.
28
 
 The trilateral cooperation that involving Singapore, Johor and Riau was proposed 
for the first time by Goh Chok Tong, Deputy Prime Minister of Singapore in December 
1989, specifically to build a triangle of growth within ASEAN. Although initially this 
was „the triangle of growth fro three areas‟ (IMS-GT, IMT-GT, BIMP-EAGE), it can be 
used as a model of economic cooperation within ASEAN. For each country, this 
cooperation has its own advantages, mainly economically so that the most advantageous 
aspects became the main consideration to be developed further.
29
 
 SIJORI is located in the most strategic sea-line that connects South China Sea and 
India Ocean through Malacca Strait. Johor has broad plantation area and good 
infrastructure, while Riau islands is part of Riau Province of Indonesia, as the great 
producer of oil and natural gas, that consists of Batam Island (415 km2), the nearest 
island to Singapore, Bintan, Bulan and some others. Singapore is a city-state, which is 
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located between Johor and Riau and who has dynamic and progressive economy. (See 
maps below: SIJORI Area and the Urban Corridors in Asia Pacific.)
30
 
 
 
 
 The role of government was part of the key factor in the sub-regional 
development since the high level of political commitment is needed, especially to protect 
and guarantee all aspects of cooperation (investment, flows of goods, people, capital; 
infrastructure, investment promotion and integration) or to anticipate negative impacts 
such as political dissatisfaction or inflation in the supporting area. Shortly, government 
mainly acts as motivator and facilitator. 
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 On 7 March 1996, the concept of Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore Growth Triangle 
(IMS-GT) formally expanded into West Sumatera (Indonesia) and Negeri Sembilan, 
Malaka and Pahang. Six working groups have been formed divided into the working 
group on infrastructure and service (hold by Indonesia), agriculture, natural resources, 
human resource development and mobility (Malaysia) and tourism and industry 
(Indonesia). Two other promising sub areas for the economic integration are following to 
be developed; they are Indonesia-Malaysia-Thailand Growth Area (IMT-GT) since 1991 
and economic sub-region in the east ASEAN, Brunei-Indonesia-Malaysia-Philippines 
(BIMP-EAGA) in 1993. 
 
AFTA – ASEAN Free Trade Area 
 Another major economic cooperation scheme is the creation of AFTA. During the 
ASEAN meeting in Kuala Lumpur 1997, the Heads of State reaffirmed their commitment 
to promote regional cooperation in Southeast Asia in the spirit of equality and partnership 
and thereby contribute towards peace, progress and prosperity in the region. Based on its 
reality which now a market of approximately 500 million people with combined Gross 
Domestic Product of US$ 600 billion, ASEAN charted a direction towards the year 2020, 
which is called ASEAN 2020. ASEAN would create more dynamic development to 
advance economic integration and cooperation, by undertaking the general strategies, 
like: fully implement the ASEAN Free Trade Area and accelerate liberalization of trades 
in services, realize the ASEAN Investment Area by 2010 and free flow of investment by 
2020; intensify and expand sub-regional cooperation in existing and new sub-regional 
growth areas; further consolidate and expand extra-ASEAN regional linkages to 
strengthen the multilateral trading system and reinforce the role of business sector as the 
engine of growth.
31
 
 More specifically the implementation of AFTA can be found in the Hanoi Plan of 
Action (1998). To accelerate AFTA, ASEAN will implement (i) Trade liberalization (i.e. 
maximize the number of tariff lines whose Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) 
tariff rates will be reduced to 0% by the year 2003 covering up to 15 commodities 
                                                 
31
 See Document of ASEAN Vision 2020 (1997), p 2. 
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groups; (ii) Customs harmonization; (iii) Standards and conformity assessment and (iv) 
other trade facilitation activities.
32
 
 AFTA is expected to open the way for further liberalization among ASEAN 
economies so that capable to increase its competitive advantage toward other Asia Pacific 
states. In the long run, with AFTA, ASEAN not only want to create a trade area but an 
investment area, since the „pull factors‟ for investment have been owned like access to 
cheaper manpower, abundant natural resources and its business infrastructure. 
 
ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) 
 Investment activity, which coloring Asia Pacific, as mentioned in section before 
was one of motivation of ASEAN Conference V in Bangkok (1995) to decide that 
ASEAN “shall work towards establishing an ASEAN investment region which will help 
enhance the area‟s attractiveness and competitiveness for promoting direct investment. 
The promotion of direct investment into and amongst ASEAN member‟s countries will 
help in the development and growth of the ASEAN economies”.33 The main goal of AIA 
is “to substantially increase the flow of investment into ASEAN from both ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN sources by enhancing ASEAN‟s attractiveness and competitiveness for 
investments. This would be done by jointly promoting ASEAN as the most attractive 
investment area and by strengthening and increasing the competitiveness of ASEAN‟s 
economic sectors through greater ASEAN cooperation and progressively reducing or 
eliminating impediments to investment.
34
 
 Within 10 to 15 years to come the character which is expected for the structure of 
IAI would like (i) the greater role of private sector in the investment cooperation in 
ASEAN; (ii) the stronger intra-ASEAN industrial link by giving preferential treatment to 
attract investment; (iii) the strong coordinated program to attract investment from 
ASEAN and non-ASEAN; (iv) all industries (either manufacture or non-manufacture), 
with limited exception could be opened for all investors. 
35
 While to achieve the above 
goals ASEAN also takes several steps through (a) ASEAN Plan of Action on 
                                                 
32
 Further details in Hanoi Plan of Action Document (1998), p 2-4. 
33
 C.P.F. Luhulima, op. cit p 182. 
34
 Recommendation of the ASEAN Head of Investment Agencies on the AIA, submitted for the 
consideration of the 28
th
 AEM Meeting. Ibid., p 182. 
35
 Ibid., p 194. 
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Cooperation and Promotion on Foreign Direct Investment and Intra ASEAN Investment; 
(b) Joint Promotion Program on Publicity, Image Building and Marketing of ASEAN‟s 
Investment Regime; (c) Consultation and Information Exchange and (d) Evaluation unit 
and ASEAN Investment analysis.
36
  
 By observing some developments on how ASEAN see the strategic chances in 
integrating the economic zone through implementing schemes like AFTA, ASEAN 
Growth Triangles, ASEAN Investment area, and next schemes like ASEAN Industrial 
Cooperation and ASEAN Services Framework Agreement we can se how the state 
leaders of ASEAN have a far vision on how regional integration on Southeast Asia 
should be managed. 
 
Conclusion 
 Major economic cooperation schemes conducted by ASEAN through AFTA, 
ASEAN Growth Triangles, ASEAN Investment area, and then the next schemes like 
ASEAN Industrial Cooperation and ASEAN Services Framework Agreement are part of 
ASEAN state leaders‟ vision on how the regional integration should be managed in 
Southeast Asia. In the beginning ASEAN just emerged from the need to overcome 
together the political and economic problems in the national, regional and international 
levels and also from the start ASEAN applied political economy approach in developing 
its regionalism. This means that implicitly, ASEAN realized that economic progress 
would be part of national resilience and security in all levels and when “globalization” 
become intensive as what we understand now – mainly as a process of functional 
integration of economic activities across national boundaries – ASEAN through its 
“regionalism project” is very ready to catch, create and develop further various chances 
provided by “globalization”, by institutionalizing the economic cooperation and 
arrangements and in the same time ASEAN responding to the security challenges in 
Asia/Asia Pacific through for instance ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum).
37
 
 So how is ASEAN related to globalization or how regionalism should be placed 
within the framework of globalization phenomenon, at least from the case of ASEAN we 
                                                 
36
 Ibid., p 197-203. 
37
 Although we do not elaborate in this paper, as a security approach toward security problems emerging in 
Southeast Asia/Asia Pacific, ARF cannot be seen separately from efforts of economic integration.  
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can find clear and certain direction. Regionalism can be an answer to the complex and 
problematic situation emerged from the „complicated‟ process of globalization -- that 
even no body knows at all its final shape – as far as actors in ASEAN can keep the 
balance between the factual condition of each member countries and the autonomous 
power of globalization, which can be in form of what we call „market power‟, „financial 
flow‟, „technological impact‟, „high-tech information‟, etc. And within more 
interdependent world, as is proved in the existing phase of globalization, regionalism of 
ASEAN is also requested to respond adequately toward more various aspects of 
interactions of its members.  
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